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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Suirmer

not for the Doyl case, which remained unchanged by both courts and legislature for more than 44 years,12 the court would have followed the result
reached by the Van Beeck case. Such a reason should not be the basis for
this unjust result and erroneous interpretation of the wrongful death statute
in Ohio.
From SIEGEL
LABOR LAW - STRIKES BEFORE THE EXPIRATION DATE OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

The employees of Wilson & Co. had a collective bargaining contract
with the company, expiring August 11, 1948.1 A strike was called March 16,
1948, more than sixty days after notice had been given pursuant to both the
contract terms and section 8 (d) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 2 As the strike was
called before the expiration date of the contract, the court held, reversing
the NLRB, that it was unlawful under section 8 (d), even though the contract did not contain a "no-strike" clause. The court thus gave a literal
interpretation to the following words of the act: " ...where there is in
effect a collective bargaining contract.., the duty to bargain collectively
shall also mean that no party... shall terminate or modify such contract...
(4) ...for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the
expiration date of such contract, whichever occars later."' (Italics supplied).
The Board's rationale was that the main purpose of Congress was to
make certain that the sixty day cooling-off period be observed before a strike
was resorted to. When Congress banned strikes for sixty days or until the
expiration of the contract, whichever occurs later, Congress intended "whichever occurs later" to apply only to cases where the sixty day notice overlapped the contraces end.
The effect of the court's decision is to read a "no strike" clause into
every collective bargaining agreement in cases involving the modification or
termination of the contract. However, strikes for other purposes are not
covered by the interpretation of 8 (d). Long term contracts will obviously
be less attractive to unions, and even though they contain "reopening"
clauses, labor's most effective economic weapon is rendered useless. On the
other hand, the NLRB's decision would render fixed term contracts relatively
meaningless in that they may be modified at any time upon sixty day notice.
Until the Supreme Court settles the question or until Congress clarifies the
law by amendment, there may be no strikes to modify or amend an existing
collective bargaining agreement before its expiration date.
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'United

Packing House Workers v. N.L.R.B., 210 F.2d 325 (1954).
'29 U.S.C. 5§ 151 et seq. (1947).
'29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1947).
'United Packinghouse Workers v. Wilson & Co., 80 F. Supp. 563, 569 (1948).

